Abstract. We show that a typed compositional theory of positive truth with internal induction for total formulae (denoted by PT tot ) is not semantically conservative over Peano arithmetic. In addition, we observe that the class of models of PA expandable to models of PT tot contains every recursively saturated model of arithmetic. Our results point to a gap in the philosophical project of describing the use of the truth predicate in model-theoretic contexts. §1. Introduction. For quite a while, conservativity has been promoted as an important trait of deflationary truth theories. To our knowledge, the idea was introduced for the first time by Leon Horsten, who declared conservativity to be a commitment of Horwich's 'minimal theory'. 1 Since then Horsten's proposal of explaining the deflationary tenet of 'thinness' or 'neutrality' of truth in terms of conservativity has been often repeated, discussed, and refined in logical and philosophical literature.
• Even without compositionality, full induction in the language with the truth predicate typically produces semantic nonconservativity of an axiomatic theory of truth. However, it is known that compositionality by itself (that is, without extended induction) can be squared with semantic conservativity. 4 The initial reception of these and related results has been mainly negative. Some authors (see in particular Shapiro (1998) and Ketland (1999) ) employed the conservativity demand as a weapon against deflationary theories of truth, arguing that deflationary truth should be conservative, but immediately adding that it cannot be, because conservative truth theories are too weak. However, more recently some defences of conservative truth theories-even in a stronger semantic sense of the word-have been put forward in the literature. In particular, Fischer & Horsten (2015) proposed to study axiomatic truth theories treated as characterisations of the use of the truth predicate in model-theoretic contexts. In their own words, There are contexts where one is reluctant to privilege one model over another, and where one does not want a theory of truth to exclude models for the original language. In particular, this is the case in the single mathematical field where truth predicates play a major role, viz. model theory, and in uses of model theory in proof theory. (Fischer & Horsten, 2015, p. 345) In effect, Fischer and Horsten describe their endeavour as similar in important respects to that of Tarski, who attempted to establish 'beyond reasonable doubt that the uses of truth predicates in metamathematics are legitimate'. (Fischer & Horsten, 2015, p. 345) Apart from semantic conservativity, there is also another desirable trait of the aforementioned 'uses of truth predicates'. Truth has expressive power-it 'widens the class of thoughts that we can express' (Fischer & Horsten, 2015, p. 345) . One indication of the expressive power is the noninterpretability of our theory of truth in its base theory of syntax; there is then a precise sense in which truth brings conceptually something new. Another indication is the nonelementary speed-up of the theory of truth with respect to its arithmetical base theory. Here the expressive power of truth manifests itself in the instrumental value of the truth predicate, namely, truth permits us to shorten proofs. All in all, the moral is that we should search for an axiomatic theory of truth T h which jointly satisfies the following requirements:
(a) T h is semantically conservative over its arithmetical base theory of syntax B,
Do we have at our disposal an axiomatic truth theory which would capture the uses of the truth predicate in model theory? It has been suggested that a theory of typed positive truth with internal induction for total formulae (denoted as PT tot in this paper 5 ) fills the bill. Below we introduce the relevant definitions.
Let L P A be the language of Peano arithmetic, with V ar and T m c being (respectively) the sets of variables and constant arithmetical terms. By L T we denote the extension of L P A with the new one-place predicate 'T (x)'. For the sentences of L P A , the notation 'Sent L P A ' will be used. By x we mean the x-th numeral, i.e., the only numeral denoting the number x. We define the following: DEFINITION 1.2. PT − is the theory in the language L T which is axiomatised by the usual axioms of Peano arithmetic (PA), together with the following truth theoretic axioms:
The above axiomatisation is the same as presented in Fischer (2009) . In Fischer & Horsten (2015) the considered theory has been augmented with two new axioms to the effect that truth is extensional and only sentences are true, i.e., with the following extensionality principle
and the normality principle
Although at some point we will consider also these additional axioms, we emphasise that in the terminology adopted in this paper they do not belong to PT − proper.
In the next move, we extend PT − with a weak form of induction for total arithmetical formulae. 6 By the principle of internal induction for total formulae (I nd tot ), we mean the following single sentence of the language L T :
where the quantifier '∀φ(x)' reads 'for every formula φ(x) with at most x free'. We read the expression 'tot(x)' as 'x is total'. We denote the theory PT − + I nd tot by PT tot .
One could wonder whether such a form of induction is not overly restrictive. Why should we have induction for total formulae only? However, Fischer and Horsten claim that the restriction becomes natural and well motivated as soon as we appreciate that it is all models of arithmetic-including the nonstandard ones-that matter:
We do not want to accept instantiations of induction for nonstandard elements that are not truth-determinate for the property in question for exactly the same reason that we resist inductive premises for soritical predicates. Note that the reply that in the "intended" model there are no such nonstandard elements to be found is not undermining our motivation for restriction; as we have emphasised repeatedly, we are adopting the model-theoretic viewpoint, and from this viewpoint, all models are on a par. (Fischer & Horsten, 2015, p. 355) In Fischer (2009) it has been claimed that PT tot is semantically conservative over PA; in the same paper the author proves that PT tot is not interpretable in its base theory (PA). In turn, in Fischer (2014) it is shown that PT tot has a nonelementary speed-up over PA. Taken together, these results imply that PT tot is indeed an excellent candidate for the role of the theory characterising the use of the truth predicate in model-theoretic contexts.
Unfortunately, the conservativity proof presented in Fischer (2009) contains a flaw. 7 Indeed, the main result of the present paper is that PT tot is not semantically conservative over Peano arithmetic (hence the same is true about PT tot with (EXT) and (NORM) added). In view of this, the question still remains whether we have at our disposal a natural axiomatic truth theory satisfying requirements (a)-(c). §2. Nonconservativity of PT tot . An easy argument based on the existence of fixed points for monotone operators shows that PT − is model-theoretically conservative over PA (see Halbach, 2011) . However, it transpires that adding internal induction for total formulae comes with a price. The following theorem states the semantic nonconservativity of PT tot . THEOREM 2.1. There is a model of PA which cannot be expanded to a model of PT tot .
Before we proceed to the proof, we shall define one construction in propositional logic which is very useful in the context of investigating compositional theories of truth with restricted induction. The construction has originally appeared in Smith (1989) although its properties were not spelled out in full generality.
we mean any of the following formulae defined by backward induction on k:
The intuition behind the above formulae is as follows: we want to search through i as long as we do not see i 0 such that α i 0 is true. Then we stop and check whether β i 0 is satisfied. If it is, then the whole formula is true, if not, then the whole formula is false, regardless of the truth value of β j for j > i 0 . We call it a disjunction, since if α is chosen so that exactly one of the α i -s is true, then the above construction is equivalent in propositional logic to the disjunction:
Although one should note that in this case it is also equivalent to
So, in a sense, it is a propositional analogue of a 1 -formula.
Given a 
In the proof we will use the well-known fact that for every standard formula ϕ(x 1 . . . x n ):
It immediately follows that for every standard formula ϕ(x 1 . . . x n ):
8 More exactly, we assume here that α and β are elements of M such that for some c ∈ M, the formal analogue of the statement 'α and β are sequences of length c containing arithmetical formulae' is true in M. 9 Again, this is taken to mean that all elements of α and β are formulae in the sense of M. 10 Note that c,α i=k β i (x, y) is a formula with two free variables: the free variable x occurring in the subformulae α i (x) and the free variable y occurring in the subformulae β j (y). 11 In effect, we easily obtain the information that for every standard formula ϕ(x), truth is provably total and consistent in PT − . In other words, if
Proof. We prove the lemma by backward metainduction on k. Starting with k = j 0 , note that there exists γ such that the disjunction of β i with stopping condition α from j 0 to c may be written as follows:
For the implication from right to left in part (a) of the lemma, assume that M | T (β j 0 (b)). Therefore by the axiom of PT − for double negation, we obtain M | T (¬¬β j 0 (b) ), which in turn (by compositional axiom for negated conjunction) permits us to conclude that
For the implication from right to left in (b) it is enough to observe that
Proving the opposite implication in (a), assume that
, and since α j 0 is standard, this gives us M | ¬T (¬α j 0 (a)), and so by the compositional axiom for double negation,
Suppose now that our claim is true for a given k + 1 ≤ j 0 . In other words, we have the following:
Our task is to prove the claim for k. Observe that by Definition 2.2:
For the implication from right to left in part (a) of the lemma, assume that M |
In effect, the compositional axiom of PT − for negated conjunction permits us to conclude also that M | T (C) and thus M | T (C ∧ D) .
For the implication from right to left in (b), assume that
, the compositional axioms of
as required.
For the implication from left to right in (a), assume that M | T (C ∧ D), so in particular
and therefore the second disjunct must be true, which by (i) permits us to conclude that M | T β j 0 (b) . 
For the implication from left to right in (b), assume that M | T ¬(C ∧ D) , so M | T (¬C) ∨ T (¬D). However, by compositional axioms
M | T (¬C) ≡ T (α k (a)) ∧ T (¬β k (b)) and since M | ¬T (α k (a)),
Proof. It is enough to observe that if
Then by Lemma 2.3 the corollary follows immediately. Now we are ready to prove our theorem. The argument will consist in showing that no nonstandard prime model of Peano arithmetic is expandable to a model of PT tot . 12 Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let K be an arbitrary nonstandard prime model of Peano arithmetic. From now on we take for granted that all elements of K are definable in K by arithmetical formulae without parameters. The claim will be that K is not expandable to a model of PT tot . Suppose for contradiction that (K , T ) | PT tot . We will argue that in such a case there is an element e of K which codes T h(K ) (that is, e codes the set of all arithmetical sentences true in K ). However, such an element e cannot exist in a prime model, because then e would be definable in K , generating a contradiction with Tarski's undefinability theorem.
For starters, fix any nonstandard c ∈ K and let α be a recursive enumeration of formal definitions up to c. That is, given a fixed recursive enumeration φ 0 (x), φ 1 (x) . . . of arithmetical formulae with exactly one free variable x, each α i (x) has the form:
For a ∈ K , we say that α i (x) defines a in K iff i is the smallest natural number such that K | α i (a). Observe that since K is prime, such a number exists for every a ∈ K and a corresponding formula α i (x) is standard.
We define now the second sequence β, containing formulae β i (y) with one free variable, characterised as follows:
The expression 'T i ' stands for an arithmetical truth predicate for sentences below i. The exact shape of this predicate is not of crucial importance; what will really matter 12 Given a model M of Peano arithmetic, the universe of a prime model K can be defined as the set of all those elements of M which are definable in M by arithmetical formulae without parameters. In turn, the operations of K are defined as those of M restricted to the universe of K . For further information about prime models we refer the reader to Kaye (1991) , p. 91ff.
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is that for i ∈ ω, T i (x)-and therefore also β i (y)-is a standard arithmetical formula. 13 We define
We emphasise that ψ(x, y) and ξ(z) are defined in a model K and not externally. With c being nonstandard, both ψ(x, y) and ξ(z) should be thought of as nonstandard arithmetical formulae-elements of K which are perceived by K as formulae, not to be confused with the 'real world' arithmetical expressions. 14 We are going to show that , y) ). In order to see this, fix a ∈ K and let α j 0 (x) define a. Fixing b, it is enough to observe that the assumptions of Corollary 2.4 , y) ).
It easily follows that ∀a ∈ K (K , T ) | tot ∀x < aψ(x, y) . 15 Finally, we argue for the totality of ξ(z). Given an arbitrary a ∈ K , if (K , T ) | ∃yT (∀x < a ψ(x, y)), then (K , T ) | T (ξ(a)). Otherwise (K , T ) | ∀y¬T (∀x < a ψ(x, y)), which (by totality of '∀x < a ψ(x, y)') entails (K , T ) | T (¬ξ(a)).

For (ii), obviously (K , T ) | T ξ(0)
, 16 so we move to the second conjunct.
Let α i (x) be the least definition of b. We put
All that remains for the completion of the proof of (ii) is to show that for every
Fix such a d and let α j (x) be the least definition of d. By Lemma 2.3, it is enough to obtain (K , T ) | T β j (e ) ; in other words, we want to have 
, and so by Lemma 2.3 (K , T ) | T β j (e) . In other words, we have
It is easy now to show that (*) must hold. Fixing φ < j, we observe that if φ < i, then (K , T ) | T φ ∈ e ≡ T j (φ) because by definition, e codes only true sentences below i. Otherwise φ ≥ i, but then φ ∈ e and φ ∈ e , so by (**) we also conclude that
This finishes the proofs of (i) and (ii). At this point we know that ξ(z) is total and inductive in (K , T ) , so by the axiom of internal induction we conclude that
We will show that e codes T h(K ) in K ; in other words, we show that
Fix n ∈ ω. Let k and i be elements of ω such that
which by Lemma 2.3 is equivalent to (K , T ) | T β i (e) . In other words,
Applying disquotation (valid in PT − for standard formulae with parameters), we obtain
Since i > n, (***) follows trivially. In effect, e codes T h(K ) in K . But this is impossible in prime models, thus a contradiction is obtained and the proof is finished. §3. Expandability properties of models of PA. In this section we further approximate the class of those models of PA that admit an expansion to models of PT tot . In general, such a class is a handy tool for comparing properties of axiomatic theories of truth. Let us introduce the precise definition and a piece of notation: DEFINITION 3.1. Let T h be any extension of PA (possibly in extended language). By Th we denote the class of models of PA that can be expanded to a model of T h.
For example, it is known that for every nonstandard model M, M ∈ TB if and only if M codes its own theory, i.e.,
Results on such classes can be used to obtain some information about relative truth definability 19 between axiomatic theories of truth. The connection between these two notions is established via the following fact:
FACT 3.2. Let T h 1 , T h 2 be two axiomatic truth theories. If T h 1 is relatively truth definable in T h 2 , then Th 2 ⊆ Th 1 .
For the (immediate) proof, see Fujimoto (2010) . In the previous section we showed that the class of prime models of PA is disjoint from PT tot . In the next theorem, we approximate this class from below (by RS we denote the class of recursively saturated models of PA). For technical simplicity, we will prove the theorem for the stronger theory PT tot + (EXT) + (NORM), which from now on we will denote by RPT tot (regular PT tot ). Note that since PT tot is a subtheory of RPT tot , the above result clearly implies that every recursively saturated model of PA can be expanded to a model of PT tot .
The proof follows immediately from two lemmata, which we consider interesting also for their own sake. Before stating them, let us introduce two more notions (the expressions Sent M , T m c M , Form 1 M denote the set of arithmetical sentences, closed terms and arithmetical formulae with at most one free variable in the sense of a model M): DEFINITION 3.4. By the term formulation of PT − , denoted by tPT − , we mean PT − with the quantifier axioms:
replaced with the following ones:
We define the term formulation of PT tot as the term formulation of PT − extended with the internal induction axiom (I nd tot ). We note that there is no need to define the term formulations of RPT or RPT tot , since over any extension of PT − containing (EXT) the conditions 6 (7) and 6 (7 ) are equivalent.
Since n−1 ⊆ ω , then the same holds also for ω (this is also the general pattern ofBut n is arithmetically definable by formula n (x), so we have the induction axiom for it already in PA.
Theorem 3.3 follows easily from Lemmas 3.9 and 3.10.
REMARK 3.11. We have decided to isolate the two lemmata, because we believe that they both give rise to interesting questions. The first one, based on Lemma 3.9, is as follows: What can be said about a model M given that we know the number of iterations of needed to obtain the least fixpoint? What we do know is that the converse to Lemma 3.9 holds, i.e., if ω is a fixpoint of , then M is recursively saturated (the proof of this observation is beyond the scope of this paper Proof. By theorems of Kaufmann-Schmerl (see Kossak & Schmerl, 2006) and Smith (1989) , there is a recursively saturated model of PA which does not admit an expansion to a model of CT − or UTB (a rather classless model). By Theorem 3.3, this model (being recursively saturated) can be expanded to a model of PT tot . Hence, there is a model of PA which expands to a model of PT tot but does not expand to a model of CT − or UTB. Our corollary follows now from Fact 3.2. §4. Concluding remarks. By Theorem 2.1, we know that PT tot does not satisfy the semantic conservativity condition. On the other hand, by Theorem 3.3 we also know that, unlike in the case of CT − , the interpretation of the truth predicate of PT tot can be found in an arbitrary recursively saturated model of Peano arithmetic. Now, where does it leave Fischer's and Horsten's project?
In view of the aforementioned results, there are two possible moves to consider. One of them consists in rejecting PT tot and searching for another truth theory, satisfying all the demands (a)-(c) from p. 188 of this paper. The second option would involve modifying the demands, in particular, weakening the semantic conservativity requirement.
It is our opinion that the adoption of the second strategy would have far-reaching consequences; namely, that it would amount to nothing less than dropping the original project of providing a characterisation of the use of the truth predicate in model theory. As stressed by Fischer and Horsten, general model theory does not discriminate between models and any description of the notion of model-theoretic truth should take this fact into account. Why then should expandability of all recursively saturated models-but not, say, of prime models-matter for such an endeavour? What is it that permits us to treat model theory as being specifically about recursively saturated models? We are not aware of any convincing answer to this question.
Admittedly, expandability of recursively saturated models guarantees the syntactic conservativity of a given theory of truth. Indeed, syntactic conservativity is crucial for a related but different philosophical project, proposed in Fischer (2014) and , where the core idea is to present truth as an instrumental device, on a par with 'ideal elements in mathematics' in Hilbert's programme (cf. Fischer, 2015, p. 294 ). In such a context, there is still a place for theories like PT tot . Nevertheless, we should emphasise that the present project-that of characterising the use of the truth predicate in model theory-is different and we just do not see how it could proceed without the semantic conservativity condition.
